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Abstract 
The importance of posterior consistency in the robustness of Bayesian analysis is 
examined and discussed.  The notions of sufficient and minimal sufficient parameters 
are introduced and important consistency results for such parameters are derived.  We 
see that minimal sufficient parameters are fundamental in characterising the relationship 
between data and parameters.  The concept of identifiability is then introduced and 
several equivalent definitions are given.  The relationship between consistency and 
identifiability is examined and means of establishing identifiability are examined with a 
view to finding useful practical tests of identifiability.  These results are applied to a 
simple example involving non response. 
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This paper arose out of an examination of survey problems involving non 
response.  In such problems we are faced with the dilemma of attempting to make 
inferences about some quantity of interest in the presence of nuisance parameters 
(the nuisance parameters in this case being the probability of response conditional 
on the quantity of interest).  This is nothing new.  Problems involving nuisance 
parameters abound in statistics and, within the Bayesian paradigm, present no 
more of a theoretical challenge than problems without nuisance parameters. 
 
However, in the case of survey problems involving non response it turns out 
that under a wide enough specification of possible priors we can be led to any 
inferences.  Moreover, this holds regardless of the amount of data we have 
observed.  Thus, it is clear that such problems are highly dependent upon 
assumptions regarding the propensity to respond.  Intuitively, we may feel that 
there is an inherent limit on our ability to make inferences in these cases; we may 
even feel that such problems are so sensitive to assumptions that the data really 
isn’t telling us anything at all.  So is there something fundamentally different 
about these problems from other problems involving nuisance parameters?  This 
paper answers this question using the concept of identifiability.  This concept is 
explored within the Bayesian paradigm and its relationship to consistency and 
general robustness is explained. 
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1. The dichotomy between likelihood and prior beliefs 
 
Let  and ( )1 2 3, , ,...x x x≡x ( )1 2, ,...,k kx x x≡x  and suppose that we are interested 
in making inferences about a quantity θ .  From the Radon-Nikodym Theorem, for 
any quantity ( , )θ π  for which ( ),θ π P  dominates ( )kp x , we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ), ,k kp p dθ π θ= π∫x x  P  
From the Representation Theorem of de Finetti (1980) and the work of Fortini, 
Ladelli and Regazzini (2000) we know that if  is an exchangeable Polish space 
then there exists some quantity 
x
π  so that the elements of ,θ πx  are independent 
and identically distributed, leading us to the general predictive model: 
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where ( ) ( ),xL p x ,θ π θ≡ π  is the likelihood and ( ) ( )( ), ln ,x xl Lθ π θ≡ π
                                                          
 is the 
log-likelihood.  This result justifies working within the common Bayesian 
paradigm of a model dichotomized between likelihood and prior.  Needless to say, 
this mathematical form arises under a wide class of Bayesian models1.  Bernardo 
and Smith (1994) rightly stress that both the likelihood and prior are essential to 
the predictive model and are both the consequences of the exchangeability 
assumption.  However, this does not suggest that there are no differences between 
formulating beliefs about observables and formulating beliefs about unobservable 
parameters.  In particular, due to experience, we should expect that we are more 
adept at making judgements about quantities that are —at least in principle— 
observable than those that are not.  After all, we receive feedback, by observation, 
about the correctness of our judgments about the former, but not the latter.  Thus, 
it is not surprising that, within the Bayesian paradigm, greater debate surrounds 
the choice of an appropriate prior than the choice of an appropriate likelihood. 
 
1 Further invariance conditions (beyond exchangeability) may ensure that the likelihood takes on a 
particular parametric form. 
2. Robustness testing using sensitivity analysis 
 
Since we are not confident of our ability to make judgements about quantities 
that are not observable we are lead naturally to ask how much our conclusions 
depend upon these judgments; this leads us naturally to the concept of robustness 
testing; that is, testing the sensitivity of our inferences to our prior beliefs.  The 
issue of robustness is critical to Bayesian analysis.  Indeed, the most common 
criticism of the Bayesian paradigm from frequentist practitioners is the 
subjectivity inherent in making precise —and often fairly arbitrary— prior 
judgements.  These criticisms can be met by using sensitivity analysis to test the 
robustness of inferences and predictions and by using wide classes of priors to 
represent ignorance.  Unfortunately, in a certain sense, our inferences are always 
highly sensitive to our prior beliefs. 
 
THEOREM 1 (Prior Sensitivity Theorem): For k∈`  and for any posterior belief 
 on the support for k P θ  of  there exists a prior belief  for kLx P ( ),θ π  satisfying: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) , : ,kk L dθ π θ ,θ π θ∈∝ ∫ xAP A P π  for all . A
 
PROOF: See Appendix.  ■ 
 
It follows that, with a finite amount of data, by appropriate choice of prior 
belief we can obtain any posterior belief that is not completely contradicted by the 
data.  This means that we are not able to obtain useful results unless we restrict our 
attention to some class of priors that is smaller than the class of all possible prior 
beliefs. 
 
Thus, instead of considering all possible prior beliefs we specify some narrower 
class of prior beliefs (which may still be extremely wide if we consider ourselves 
completely ignorant) and analyse how our inferences change for these different 
priors.  If our inferences are fairly similar regardless of which prior we use, then 
we may be confident in our analysis regardless of our confidence in our prior 
beliefs.  If our inferences are very different under different prior beliefs then we 
may not be so confident.  In general we determine our class of reasonable priors 
by reference to available prior evidence.  In the absence of such evidence, Walley 
(1991) suggests that we model prior ignorance by using a class of priors that is 
vacuous —in the sense that a priori our inferential and predictive probabilities of 
interest vary over the entire unit interval.  However, there are unlimited classes 
that meet this criterion, each having different consequences a posteriori and 
therefore having different consequences in terms of robustness.   
 
While helpful, this method and others have one important shortcoming in that 
they may invite further questions of sensitivity.  After all, did our robustness 
analysis depend heavily on the chosen class of priors, leading us to wonder about 
the robustness of our robustness analysis, and so on, ad infinitum? 
 
This shortcoming of sensitivity analysis invites us to pursue more objective 
methods of testing the sensitivity of our inferences to our prior beliefs; that is, 
methods that do not require any further assumptions —assumptions that may 
themselves induce questions of sensitivity.  Since the existence of a prior belief 
inducing a particular posterior belief is ensured only for finite observations it 
should already be evident that perfect information may hold the key.  To explore 
this line of thought further we introduce the notion of consistency. 
 
3. Posterior consistency 
 
DEFINITION 1 (Consistency): For any hypothesis φ ∈A  and given posterior belief 
( ) (k kP φ≡ ∈ xP A A )  we let ( ) ( )lim kk∞ →∞≡P A P A  be our posterior belief about 
the hypothesis under perfect information.  We say that our beliefs about the 
hypothesis are consistent if and only if ( ) ( )I φ∞ = ∈P A A .  Further, we say that 
our beliefs about φ  are consistent if and only if ( ) ( )I φ∞ = ∈P A A  for all . A
 
Consistency asserts that our belief about the parameter converges —under 
perfect information— to certain belief in the true values of the parameter.  At this 
point it is prudent to raise and rebut a common and flawed objection to the above 
analysis and to remind the reader of the correct approach.  The objection in 
question is the assertion that, within the Bayesian paradigm, there is no such thing 
as a true parameter; that the parameter is not an existent but an abstraction which 
has no true value.  However, the operational approach to statistics —as expounded 
by de Finetti— renders this argument invalid.  Under the operational approach all 
parameters are functions of the empirical distribution of the appropriate 
superpopulations and are thereby reducible to some aspect of reality if only in 
limiting form; parameters are not merely some abstract index to a probabilistic 
belief.  To talk of beliefs about a parameter that cannot be reduced to some aspect 
of reality is arbitrary in the sense expounded by Peikoff (1993): 
An arbitrary statement has no relation to man’s means of knowledge.  Since the statement 
is detached from the realm of evidence, no process of logic can assess it. 
Such statements are inadmissible; no meaningful discussion can be made 
concerning a parameter which is defined merely by a floating abstraction.  Rather, 
we must define our terms by reference to reality (operationally) so that parameters 
are indeed aspects of reality with a true value. 
 
4. Minimal sufficient parameters 
 
In order to determine a useful test of consistency we analyze the way in which 
data provides us with information regarding the parameters.  It is well known that 
statistical models provide us with information from the data only through the value 
of the minimal sufficient statistic (with respect to our likelihood and the 
parameters of interest).  However, it is not always appreciated that this property 
also applies to parameters; that is, statistical models provide us with information 
about the parameters only through the value of the minimal sufficient parameter.  
To see this we introduce the notions of the sufficient and minimal sufficient 
parameter following Barankin (1961). 
 
DEFINITION 2 (Sufficient and minimal sufficient parameters): Given a 
likelihood function  with parameter xL ( ),θ π , the parameter ( , )φ θ π≡ Λ  is said 
to be a sufficient parameter if it is sufficient for x  in the usual sense.  Moreover, 
φ  is said to be a minimal sufficient parameter if it is a sufficient parameter and 
can be expressed as a function of any sufficient parameter. 
Sufficient and minimal sufficient parameters are almost entirely analogous to 
sufficient and minimal sufficient statistics.  Indeed, the only difference is that the 
likelihood function —considered as a function of the parameters— induces only a 
sigma finite measure rather than a probability measure on the parameter space; this 
property is not needed for most theorems involving sufficiency and minimal 
sufficiency so that the same properties generally apply.  In particular, we note that 
there is always a minimal sufficient parameter and therefore a sufficient parameter 
since the function  is itself a minimal sufficient parameter.  In fact, proceeding 
analogously to Lehmann and Scheffé (1951) it can easily be shown that any 
minimal sufficient parameter 
xL
φ  is an injective (that is, one to one) function of .  
Just as minimal sufficient statistics are able to capture and summarise all relevant 
information supplied by data, so too, minimal sufficient parameters are able 
capture and summarise all relevant information about the parameters. 
xL
 
4.1. Minimal sufficient parameters and inference 
 
Sufficient parameters have certain useful informatory properties which ensure 
that, in a useful sense, they completely characterize the likelihood function.  If φ  
is a sufficient parameter then we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ), ,xL h x g ,θ π φ θ= π  
for some functions h  and  by the Neyman Factorization Theorem.  It follows 
that: 
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so that ( ),x θ π φ⊥ .  That is, regardless of the likelihood function, the data are 
independent of the parameters given knowledge of any sufficient parameter.  
Indeed, Dawid (1979) defines sufficiency directly in terms of conditional 
independence. 
 
This conditional independence relation has three important consequences.  
Firstly, if φ  is a sufficient parameter, then letting ( ) ( )xL p xφ φ≡  we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , ,x xL p x p x p x Lθ π θ π θ π φ φ= = = = φ  
so that the likelihood function depends upon the parameters ( ),θ π  only through 
sufficient parameters; this means that the likelihood function can be written in 
terms of any sufficient parameter. 
 
Secondly, if φ  is a sufficient parameter, we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
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p L dP Lφ φ φ
= =
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∏ ∏∫x  
so that the predictive distribution depends upon the parameters ( ),θ π  only 
through sufficient parameters. 
 
Finally, if φ  is a sufficient parameter, we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , E ,k kp p dP pθ π θ π φ φ θ π φ= =∫x x kx
)
 
so that the inferential distribution of the parameters depends upon the parameters 
( ,θ π  only through sufficient parameters.  This holds also for any function of the 
parameters.  In particular, if ( ),fτ θ π=  we have x τ φ⊥  so that: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )Ek kp p dP pτ τ φ φ τ φ= =∫x x kx  
It is pertinent to note that ( ,p )θ π φ  and ( )p τ φ  are determined by our prior 
beliefs so that these results are of fundamental importance in considering 
robustness. 
 
Since these properties hold for all sufficient parameters, it follows that the 
likelihood function and inferential distribution depend upon the parameters only 
through minimal sufficient parameters.  Thus, regardless of the form of the 
likelihood function —and thus regardless of our model assumptions— we know 
that the data provides us with information about the parameter of interest only 
through the minimal sufficient parameter. 
 
4.2. Minimal sufficient parameters and inference under perfect information 
 
In addition to characterizing the likelihood function, minimal sufficient parameters 
have an important asymptotic property that is of fundamental importance in 
considering robustness to prior beliefs.  This property is an extension of widely 
known asymptotic results for Bayesian statistics.  To facilitate these results we let 
( ) (k P φ≡ ∈ xP A A )k  be our posterior belief for φ ∈A  given knowledge of  
and we let 
kx
( ) ( )lim kk∞ →∞≡P A P A  be our posterior belief about φ  under perfect 
information. 
 
DEFINITION 3 (The Wald function): Given likelihood  that has sufficient 
parameter 
xL
φ  with range , let Φ λ  be the Wald function of φ  defined by 
( ) ( )(E xr l r )λ φ≡  and let ( ) ( )* supr rλ λ∈≡ AA  and . ( )* arg supr rλ∈ΦΦ ≡
 
THEOREM 2 (Convergence of sufficient parameters): If the elements of φx  are 
independent with likelihood  that has sufficient parameter xL φ  then —under the 
regularity conditions of Berk (1970)— if ( ) ( )* *λ λ< ΦA  then ( )( )0 1P ∞ = =P A . 
 
THEOREM 3 (Convergence of sufficient parameters): If the elements of φx  are 
independent with likelihood  that has sufficient parameter xL φ  then —under the 
regularity conditions of Berk (1970)— if *Φ  is not empty then the hypothesis 
 is almost surely consistent; that is, we have *φ ∈Φ ( )( )* 1 1P ∞ Φ = =P . 
 
PROOFS: See Appendix.  ■ 
 
Theorem 3 shows that, under wide regularity conditions, our posterior belief 
about any sufficient parameter converges —under perfect information— to certain 
belief in the set of values that maximize the Wald function.  It turns out that for 
minimal sufficient parameters we have a stronger convergence result. 
 
THEOREM 4 (Consistency of minimal sufficient parameters): If the elements of 
φx  are independent with likelihood  that has minimal sufficient parameter xL φ  
then —under the regularity conditions of Berk (1970)— the parameter φ  is almost 
surely consistent; that is, we have { }( )( )1 1P φ∞ = =P . 
 
PROOF: See Appendix.  ■ 
 
Theorem 4 shows that, under wide regularity conditions, our posterior belief 
about any minimal sufficient parameter converges, under perfect information, to 
certain belief in the true value of that parameter.  We note again that the 
operational approach to statistics ensures that the minimal sufficient parameter 
exists in the metaphysical sense and therefore has a true value. 
 
We have now seen the relationship between consistency, sufficiency and 
minimal sufficiency for parameters.  We now proceed to consider the notion of 
identifiability that seeks to determine whether the data gives information regarding 
the parameter of interest. 
 
5. Identifiability 
 
We have seen that, regardless of our model assumptions, the data provides us 
with information about the parameter of interest only through the minimal 
sufficient parameter.  We have also seen that our beliefs about the minimal 
sufficient parameter will converge —under perfect information— to certain belief 
in the true value of that parameter.  Whether this information about the minimal 
sufficient parameter in turn determines the parameter of interest is determined by 
the concept of identifiability. 
 
DEFINITION 4 (Identifiability): Given a likelihood function  with sufficient 
parameter 
xL
( , )θ π  the parameter θ  is said to be identifiable if and only if there 
exists a function  such that g ( )gθ φ=  where φ  is a minimal sufficient parameter. 
 
If θ  is identifiable then we may determine the parameter of interest from our 
minimal sufficient parameter and so the data provides information directly about 
θ .  Conversely, if θ  is unidentifiable then we cannot determine the parameter of 
interest from any minimal sufficient parameter and so the only information about 
θ  provided by the data is through the relationship between the minimal sufficient 
parameter and the parameter of interest (which is determined by our prior beliefs).  
We note finally that the choice of minimal sufficient parameter φ  in the definition 
of identifiability is immaterial since all minimal sufficient parameters are injective 
transformations of one another.  The notion of identifiability is expressed 
somewhat differently in the literature.  Rothenberg (1971) and Bowden (1973) 
define global identifiability in terms of observational equivalence of parameters. 
 
DEFINITION 5 (Observational equivalence): Given a likelihood function  the 
parameter values 
xL
φ′  and φ′′  are said to be observationally equivalent if they are 
pairwise sufficient for x  in the usual sense; that is, if ( ) ( )x xL Lφ φ′ ′′=  almost 
surely with respect to the sampling measure based on either parameter value. 
 
DEFINITION 6 (Identifiability): Given a likelihood function  with sufficient 
parameter 
xL
( , )θ π  the parameter θ  is said to be globally identifiable if and only if 
all observationally equivalent parameter values have the same value of θ . 
 
Halmos and Savage (1949) and Bahadur (1954) show that sufficiency is 
equivalent to pairwise sufficiency for dominated sampling measures; even for 
measures that are not dominated, sufficiency implies pairwise sufficiency.  It 
follows that all parameter values that correspond to the same value of a sufficient 
parameter are observationally equivalent.  Thus we see that, for dominate 
sampling measures, the definition of identifiability in Definition 4 is equivalent to 
the definition of global identifiability in Definition 6, used by Rothenberg (1971), 
Bowden (1973) and others.  In practice we generally deal only with sampling 
measures using a density or mass function so that we are always dealing with 
dominated sampling measures.  We will therefore take Definitions 4 and 6 as 
equivalent definitions of identifiability. 
5.1. Identifiability and inference under perfect information 
 
Using the above posterior convergence results, the concept of identifiability 
leads us easily to another useful asymptotic result.  To facilitate this result we will 
let ( ) (k P θ≡ ∈ xG A A )k  be our posterior belief for θ ∈A  given knowledge of 
 and we let kx ( ) (lim kk∞ →∞≡G A G A )  be our posterior belief about θ  under perfect 
information. 
 
THEOREM 5 (Identifiability and consistency): If the elements of φx  are 
independent with likelihood  such that xL θ  is identifiable then —under the 
regularity conditions of Berk (1970)— the parameter θ  is almost surely 
consistent; that is, we have { }( )( )1 1P θ∞ = =G . 
 
PROOF: Follows trivially from Theorem 4.  ■ 
 
Theorem 5 shows that, if the parameter of interest is identifiable then, under 
wide regularity conditions, our posterior belief about the parameter of interest 
converges to certain belief in the true value of that parameter.  We can see that 
identifiability is an important property of a statistical model.  If the parameter of 
interest is identifiable then we know that the data is providing us with information 
about this parameter via the minimal sufficient parameter.  However, if the 
parameter of interest is unidentifiable then the data is providing us with 
information that determines only the value of the minimal sufficient parameter, 
which may correspond with several possible values of the parameter of interest. 
 
5.2. Tests for identifiability 
 
An obvious test of identifiability is suggested by Definition 4; namely, 
determine a minimal sufficient parameter and then determine whether the 
parameter of interest is a function of that parameter.  However, it may be difficult 
to find a minimal sufficient parameter (for a good algorithm see Johnson (1974)) 
and it may also be difficult to decide whether the minimal sufficient parameter can 
be inverted to obtain the parameter of interest.  Instead of relying on minimal 
sufficient parameters we can test for identifiability using sufficient parameters, 
which are easy to determine. 
 
THEOREM 6 (Identifiability using sufficient parameters): Given a likelihood 
function  with sufficient parameter xL ( ),φ θ π= Λ  the parameter θ  is identifiable 
if and only if ( ) (, ),θ π θ π′ ′ ′′Λ = Λ ′′  implies that θ θ′ ′′= . 
 
PROOF: Follows easily from Definition 4 and the fact that any minimal sufficient 
parameter is a function of φ .  ■ 
 
Alternatively, we may wish to test identifiability according to Definition 4.6.  
An obvious test of identifiability is again suggested; namely, determine the 
conditions under which parameter values are observationally equivalent and then 
determine whether these conditions imply the equivalence of the parameter of 
interest.  Following the work of Rothenberg (1971) and Bowden (1973) we can 
further simplify this test by using a distance function that measures the distance 
between two probability densities.  Bowden (1973) tests for identifiability using 
the Kullback-Liebler distance function  defined by: H
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It can be shown that  is a distance function in the usual sense.  In particular 
it can be shown that  with 
H
( ), ; , 0H θ π θ π′ ′ ′′ ′′ ≥ ( ), ; , 0H θ π θ π′ ′ ′′ ′′ =  if and only if 
( ),θ π′ ′  and ( , )θ π′′ ′′  are observationally equivalent.  This function —or indeed 
any other distance function— can be used to simplify the test of identifiability 
based on Definition 4.6 as follows. 
 
THEOREM 7 (Identifiability using distance functions): Given a likelihood 
function  with sufficient parameter xL ( ),θ π  and a distance function , the 
parameter 
H
θ  is identifiable if and only if ( ), ; , 0H θ π θ π′ ′ ′′ ′′ =  implies that 
θ θ′ ′= ′ .2 
 
PROOF: Follows trivially from Definition 6 and the properties of .  ■ H
 
Thus, we have at our disposal, several equivalent definitions leading to methods of 
testing for identifiability.  A more detailed analysis of the conditions required for 
identifiability is given in Roehrig (1988).  We will not have need for a detailed 
discussion of these conditions since we are concerned here only with the 
identifiability of models for surveys subject to non response and self selection. 
 
6.  Identifiability and non response 
 
The Representation Theorem of de Finetti shows that if  is exchangeable with 
elements having finite range 1 , then the elements follow a multinomial 
model with the long run proportions of outcomes as parameter (see also Fortini, 
Ladelli and Regazinni (2000)).  We can see that this parameter is identifiable in 
the model of interest. 
x
, 2,..., m
 
EXAMPLE 1: Suppose that  is exchangeable with elements having finite range 
 so that we have likelihood: 
x
1, 2,..., m
( ) ( )
1
m
I x i
x i
i
L θ θ =
=
=∏  
where ( )1 2, ,..., mθ θ θ θ≡  with: 
( )1lim n jji n I x inθ =→∞
=≡ ∑ . 
Since θ  is a sufficient parameter it follows that θ  is identifiable.  ■ 
 
                                                          
2 In the case when  is divergent we will —by convention— say that H ( ), ; , 0H θ π θ π′ ′ ′′ ′′ = ∞ > . 
Example 1 shows us that, in the standard multinomial model, the parameter of 
the long run proportions of outcomes is identifiable.  It follows from Theorem 5 
that, under perfect information, our posterior beliefs will converge to certain belief 
in the true long run proportions.  However, if instead of observing the elements of 
 directly we observe them subject to some possibility of non-response then we 
have the following model. 
x
 
EXAMPLE 2: Continuing Example 1, suppose that ( )1 2 3, , ,...m m m≡m  is an 
indicator of whether the associated values of  are missing and that we observe: x
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If  is exchangeable then we have likelihood: m
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where ( )1 2, ,..., mπ π π π≡  with: 
( )
( )1 1
, 0
lim
n
j jj
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I x i m
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=
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To see that θ  is not identifiable we note that for any θ θ′ ′′≠  and ( )i i i iπ θ π θ′′ ′ ′ ′′=  
then we have ( ) (,y yL L ),θ π θ π′ ′ ′′= ′′  for all .  ■ y
 
Example 2 shows us that, in the model in Example 2, the parameter of the long 
run proportions of outcomes is not identifiable.  In fact it can be shown that the 
above model has minimal sufficient parameter ( )1 2, ,..., mφ φ φ φ≡  with i i iφ θ π≡  so 
that, under perfect information, our posterior beliefs about φ  converge to certain 
belief in the true value of φ .  Since θ φ≥  perfect information restricts the possible 
range of the parameter of interest but it does not allow us to determine the 
parameter with certainty.  This property is in fact what makes non response 
problems fundamentally different from most other problems involving nuisance 
parameters.  In such problems the data gives us information, not about the 
parameter of interest, but about a minimal sufficient parameter from which we are 
unable to obtain the parameter of interest.  We have seen that, in such cases, no 
amount of data can overcome this problem.  However, if we were to place 
restrictions on the possible values of π  then we may obtain an identifiable model. 
 
EXAMPLE 3: Continuing Example 2, suppose that i jπ π=  for all  so that we 
have likelihood: 
,i j
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
, 1
m
I yI y i I y
y i
i
L θ π θ π π == ≠
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To see that θ  is identifiable we note that for any θ θ′ ′′≠  we have 
( ) ( ), ,x xL Lθ π θ′ ′= π′  for .  ■  y = i
 
Example 3 shows us that, if we assume that the long run proportion of 
respondents of each type is the same then θ  becomes identifiable in the model.  
This means that without this additional assumption, even under perfect information 
our inferences are sensitive to our prior assumptions.  However, with this 
additional assumption, under perfect information our inferences are not sensitive 
to our prior assumptions.  It should therefore be obvious that the model is sensitive 
to this assumption in the sense that the absence of the assumption leaves the model 
unidentifiable and therefore highly sensitive to prior beliefs.  From the perspective 
of robustness testing the question then becomes: are we confident enough in this 
additional assumption to warrant its inclusion in the likelihood model? 
 
7.  An objective robustness test 
 
The above analysis suggests that a test of identifiability itself provides a useful 
test of robustness to prior beliefs.  Aside from the regularity conditions involved 
(which hold widely and can be easily tested on a case by case basis) tests of 
identifiability are equivalent to tests of the asymptotic behaviour of the parameter 
of interest under perfect information; this is of direct interest in its own right.  
Moreover, tests of identifiability are objective, in that they do not require any 
assumptions beyond those invariance assumptions that determine the likelihood 
function.  This is also important since it avoids raising further questions of 
sensitivity to assumptions (the avoidance of which is the point of robustness 
testing in the first place). 
What then are we to make of the results of such a test?  If the parameter of 
interest is identifiable then we know that the data is providing information directly 
about the parameter of interest, and to such an extent that perfect information 
would lead to certain belief in the true parameter of interest.  This is all good news 
and we may legitimately conclude that with enough data, our model will be robust 
to prior assumptions.  However, if the parameter of interest is unidentifiable then 
we know that the data is not providing us with information about the parameter of 
interest except through the relationship between the parameter of interest and the 
minimal sufficient parameter (which is entirely determined by our prior beliefs). 
 
The only question that may remain is the sensitivity to prior beliefs for a certain 
finite amount of data (most obviously the amount actually observed).  
Unfortunately we have seen that in answering this question any posterior belief is 
possible and supplying a ‘more practical’ answer necessarily involves the 
(possibly arbitrary) limitation of the class of prior beliefs under consideration, 
which may lead to further questions of sensitivity. 
 
7.1. Making assumptions in order to obtain informativity 
 
We have seen that identifiability is a useful and important concept in 
determining robustness and thus, in determining the degree to which we can trust 
inferences from our models.  We may even go so far as to say that we cannot trust 
inferences from unidentifiable models at all.  We should therefore make every 
attempt to ensure that our sampling mechanism and accompanying assumptions 
lead to a model that is identifiable for the parameters of interest. 
 
However, practitioners should be wary of stipulating assumptions (particularly 
about unobservable limiting quantities) merely in order to obtain identifiability; 
after all, a model that is robust to prior assumption but is predicated on flawed 
likelihood assumptions is no better than a model that is sensitive to prior 
assumptions.  In cases of self selection where high non response rates can be 
expected it may be more prudent to reject data altogether and admit that no 
reliable inferences are possible rather than to churn data through a flawed model. 
Appendix: Proof of Theorems 
 
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: Let ( ) ( ){ }, :θ π θ≡C A A∈ .  Since the posterior  is 
concentrated on the support for 
k P
θ  of  we may restrict our attention to 
k
Lx
( )supp θ⊆A ; the equality holds trivially for  outside this support.  Let  be 
our posterior belief for (
A kG
),θ π  so that ( ) ( )( ) ,k kd θ π= ∫C AP A G .  We define 
( )( ) ( ) (( ) 1 ,k kL d ),θ π θ−≡ ∫ xC AP C A G π  so that  and so that k G P 1kL−x  is the 
Radon-Nikodym derivative kd dP G .  Since 1kL
−
x  is strictly positive over 
( )(supp )θC  we also have  so that kP G kkd d L= xG P .  It follows that: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ), , kkk k dd d Ld ,dθ π θ π= = =∫ ∫ ∫ xC A C A C AGP A G P PP θ π  
which was to be shown.  ■ 
 
PROOF OF THEOREM 2: Theorem 3.3 of Berk (1970) shows that, under the 
regularity conditions specified there, if ( ) ( )* *λ λ< ΦA  then ( )( )0 1P φ∞ = =P A .  
It follows from the Radon-Nikodym Theorem that if ( ) ( )* *λ λ< ΦA  then: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )0 0P P dP dPφ φ φ∞ ∞= = = = =∫ ∫P A P A 1  
which was to be shown.  ■ 
 
The regularity conditions for Theorem 2 are required to ensure the existence of 
the posterior distribution and to ensure that where a sequence of functions 
approach a limiting function, the arguments that maximize the latter are the limit 
of the arguments that maximize the former.  Berk (1970) gives wide conditions 
under which this occurs; Wald (1949) gives simpler but narrower conditions (see 
also Berk (1966) and Huber (1967)).  The actual result given in Berk (1970) holds 
under wider conditions than are given here; we will not have need of the wider 
theorem since the convergence of the minimal sufficient parameter does not 
always hold under the wider conditions. 
 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3: For all i∈`  let ( ) ( ){ }  *: 1i r r iλ λ≡ < Φ −A  so that 
.  From Theorem 1 we then have: ( ) (* * iλ λ< ΦA )
) 0( )(  0iP ∞ > =P A  for all i∈` . 
Since  is not empty and since *Φ *
1 ii
∞
=Φ =∪ A  it follows that: 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )  *
1
1 1 : 0 1 0 1i i
i
P P i P
∞
∞ ∞ ∞
=
Φ = = − ∀ ∈ > ≥ − > =∑`P P A P A  
which was to be shown.  ■ 
 
Theorem 3 shows the convergence of our posterior beliefs about sufficient 
parameters to the set of values that maximise the Wald function.  Following a 
proof by Wald (1949) we now show that for minimal sufficient parameters the true 
value of the parameter uniquely maximises the Wald function. 
 
LEMMA 1: If the likelihood  has minimal sufficient parameter xL φ  then 
{ }* φΦ = . 
 
PROOF: For all r∈Φ  we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )E E ln xx x x
L r
r l r l
L
λ λ φ φ φ φφ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟− = − = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
Since φ  is minimal sufficient, it follows from Lehmann and Scheffé (1951) that 
( ) ( )x xL r L φ≠  for all r φ≠ .  It then follows from Jensen’s Inequality that: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )ln E ln 1 0xx
L r
r
L
λ λ φ φφ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟− < =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
=  for all r φ≠  
so that  for all ( ) ( )rλ φ λ> r φ≠ .  Thus { }* φΦ =  which was to be shown.  ■ 
 
PROOF OF THEOREM 4: From Lemma 1 we have { }* φΦ = .  From Theorem 2 we 
then have  which was to be shown.  ■ { }( )( 1P φ∞ = =P ) 1
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